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The Criminal Law In Civil Cases
The criminal law has fallen into disrepute. Its administration and its content are considered so vicious that
there are many persons who believe that to practice criminal law is necessarily reprehensible and that even the
study of criminal law should be sedulously avoided.' The
practice in the criminal courts is, with a few notable and
praiseworthy exceptions, left to lawyers of lesser sensibilities, and the criminal law has become an outlaw field
which the most learned and respectable lawyers carefully
shun.2

The attitude of the bench and bar toward the criminal law has become one of juristic pessimism, and the
'Prof. Barnes, in his recent book, "The Repression of Crime,"
says, "Our legal system for ascertaining guilt and dealing with the
criminal is founded entirely upon medieval metaphysical and theological presuppositions which antedate modern biological, psychological, and social science."
2
Battling the Criminal, Child, p. 217.
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hope that its evils would be corrected by those who are engaged in its study and practice has long since been abandoned. As a consequence, the opinion generally prevails
that the business men and laborers of the country will have
to overhaul the criminal law, and, in some manner not
clearly defined, effectively remedy its evils.
The idea is a familiar one. At various times in the
history of our law, the idea that there is a lay competency
to achieve effective reforms in the law by a legislative
formulation of popular opinion has prevailed; and attempts
to carry this idea into execution have almost always been
followed by harmful consequences. It is sufficient to recall the clamor for lay judges shortly after the Revolution, the reform in the law of procedure beginning in 1850,
and the recent agitation for popular review of judicial
decisions.'
In other departments of human endeavor it is generally
conceded that reforms should be undertaken by those "who
know the problems to be met, know the materials with
which they are to be met, know the art of the craft which
will apply the materials, and know something at least of
the experience of the past out of which those materials
have been wrought. ' '4 But to most persons it does not appear to be the least radical, visionary, or absurd to suggest that judicial and legal experience and the lessons and
warnings of legal history, and the results of legal science,
may be scrapped, and the adjustment of the criminal law

3The Task of the American Lawyer, Pound.
4
" Ev.en if we had the chance none of us would think of rushing
a
into well equipped chemical laboratory and starting off on an experiment without any past training or present instruction. Not only the
danger of such action, but its futility as a means of discovery and
its crass dullness would hinder us from it. We wish to acquire at
least a preliminary knowledge of what has already been done in
this field in order to avoid waste and peril, and to obtain a good
start for ourselves. We should do well to show as much good sense
in other matters-especially where human growth and development
are involved." Light My Candle, Henry Van Dyke, p. 45.
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to human conduct and relations entrusted to those who
have no experience or training in this field.
If, however, lawyers persist in their present attitude
of indifference and their unwillingness to undertake the
reform of the criminal law, we must expect the public to
proceed blindly to do the best they can. This and the resultant evils can be avoided only by a more widespread and
intensive study of the criminal law by the members of
the bar. The attention of lawyers must be directed to a
study of what the criminal law is, how it works, where it
does not work and why, and how it may be made to work.
The criminal law must be made a field in which the lawyer
and the gentleman-in the American sense of that wordcan feel at home.5
Lawyers are not altruists. They are perhaps more selfish than the members of other trades, for, under the pretense of serving the public welfare by improving their
calling, they are endeavoring to protect their own incompetence by adopting arbitrary and unreasonable requirements for admission to the bar.6 A more widespread and
intensive study of the criminal law by lawyers-which
must be the first step in any beneficial reform-will be undertaken only when some materialistic motive for such
study can be discovered. Such a motive exists in the fact
that a knowledge of the criminal law is frequently of great
importance in the solution of civil cases. The following
instances will demonstrate this fact.
CONTRACTS
A contract is a promise, or set of promises, to which
the law attaches legal obligation.. The law does not or5The
6

Cleveland Survey, Betterman.

1t is especially significant that this endeavor is fostered by

associations of which the lawyers who do the greiat legal work of
the country are not members, and that the protagonists of these requirements are dilletante doctrinaires, who, having failed in the
practice of their profession, attempt to attain a cheap notoriety by
identifying themselves with movements which are masquerading as
"uplift" or "reform."
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dinarily attach legal obligation to a promise to commit an
act which is a crime, and therefore such a promise is not a
contract. 7 This is the rule whether the act is made criminal by common law or statute.8 It is not based upon the
impropriety of compelling a person who has made such a
promise to pay damages, which in itself would generally
be a desirable thing, but upon the fact that the person to
whom the promise is made is regarded as a wrongdoer,
and to such a person the law denies relief. Though subject
to some exceptions and qualifications,9 it has been applied
in a great variety of cases. 10 Its proper application in
these contract cases depended upon a knowledge of the
rules of the criminal law.
The law sometimes declares that the making of certain promises with a view to establishing contractual relations is criminal, and provides a punishment therefor."
The courts have not confined their action to imposing the
penalty which such laws expressly impose upon those who
violate their provisions, but have declared that promises
made in violation of such laws are not contracts. A knowledge of these criminal laws is thus essential to the proper
decision of many contract cases.
The Sunday law furnishes an interesting illustration.
It provides: "If any person shall do or perform any worldly
employment or business * * * on Sunday * * * and be convicted thereof, every such person * * * shall * * * forfeit

and pay four dollars
constitutes a crime.

*

* **"12

A violation of this statute

13

C. J. 492; 3 P. & L. Dig. Dec. 447.
Page on Contracts, sec. 863. But it has been held that if the
promise, does not contemplate the commission of a crime, the fact
713

8

that it may furnish some incentive to commission thereof does not

necessarily make it void. 6 R. C. L., p. 715; 19 Ann. Cas. 133.
913 C. J., 492.
1013 C. J., 413.
"Williston on Contracts, sec. 1628, 1763.
12
Act of April 22, 1794.
lC. vs. Wolfe, 3 S. & R. 48.
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In construing this statute the courts have held that
it makes criminal the making of "contracts" on Sunday, because the making of contracts is worldly business and employment, and from the criminality of the making of such
"contracts" the courts have derived the voidness of such
"contracts." They have accordingly announced that not
only will they not aid in the enforcement of such promises,
but that they will not aid the parties to recover what they
have paid or sold in pursuance of such promises. They have
thus increased the penalty for this crime out of all ratio to
the turpitude of the acts committed in those cases in which
the violation of the statute consists in the making of a "contract," -and in so doing have perpetrated a gross fraud under the pretence of upholding the sanctity of a day. "It
is somewhat odd to vindicate the law, 'Rememmber the
Sabbath Day to keep it holy,' by enabling a man to defraud
his fellow man."' 14
The Sunday law is a criminal statute, but the effect
which the courts have ascribed to its violation has made it
an important part of the law of contracts. Many contract
cases have been decided by its application."
At common law the fact that the perpetrator of a
crime had settled with the victim was not a defense to a
All promises made by the perpetrator in
prosecution.'
consideration of the victim's promise not to prosecute were
7
void, and the making of such promises was itself a crime.'
An important change has been made in the law by
statute. The ninth section of the code of criminal procedure provides that if certain crimes are settled by the victim and the perpetrator in a certain way, the victim shall
thereby be relieved from criminal responsibility for the
criminal act. 8 The effect of a settlement effected in the
14 Trickett, 17 D. L. R. 155.

1517 D. L. R. 155.

16 CIark & Marshall, sec. 156.
17Clark on Contracts, p. 293.
18C. vs. Carr, 28 Super. 122; C. vs. Scott, 7 Super. 390.
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cases and in the manner prescribed in the statute is not
limited to that expressly set forth in the statute. A settlement so effected renders valid and enforceable promises
and obligations given in effecting the settlement". This
statute, though ostensibly a statute relating to criminal
procedure, has become, by reason of the interpretation
which the courts have given it, an important part of the
law of contracts.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES
The question whether a person who kills another may
acquire and keep property to which the former would have
been entitled by descent or will upon the death of the latter, if the death of the latter had been caused in any other
way, has been before the courts with increasing frequency
in recent years. In cases in which one person killed another
in order to acquire the property of his victim, three different doctrines have been announced by the courts.
In some cases it has been held that the legal title to
the property passes to the slayer, and that he may retain
the property in spite of his crime. 0 These courts have refused to read, by a resort to legal gymnastics, disqualifications into the unambiguous words of the statutes of wills
and the statutes of descent. Their decisions have been
based upon the principle of the binding force of statutes
and of wills, and upon the principle that civil courts should
21
not add to the punishment of crime.
By other courts it has been held that the legal title
does not pass to slayer as heir or as legatee or devisee.22
l 9Greer vs. Shade, 109 Pa. 180.

2OShellenberger vs. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, reversing Shellenberger vs. Ransom, 31 Neb. 61; Owens vs. Owens, 100 N. C. 240;
Deem21 vs. Milliken, 6 Ohio C. C. 357; Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203.
The Nature of Judicial Profess, Cardozo, p. 40.
22
McKinnon vs. Lundy, 24 S. C. R. 650; Riggs vs. Palmer, 115 N.
Y. 506; Wall vs. Pfanschmeat, 265 Ill. 180; Perry vs. Strawbridge, 209
Mo. 621; Box vs. Larrier, 112 Tenn. 393; Estate of Hall, (1914) P. 1.,
18; Estate of Creppen, (1911) P. 108, 115.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The principle that no man should profit from his own iniquity or take advantage of his own wrong is one of great
generality whose roots are deeply fastened in universal
sentiments of justice, and it gives rise to a strong public
policy against allowing a murderer to enjoy the benefits
of the property formerly held by his victim. To satisfy
this policy these courts have held that the slayer cannot
take the property by will or inherit it by law.
It is impossible to justify the reasoning of the courts
in these cases. In case of inheritance, the court cannot
rightfully say that the title does not descend, when a statute-the supreme law-says that it shall. In case of a will,
if the legal title does not pass to the legatee or devisee,
it must be because the will is revoked by the killing. But
when the legislature has enacted that no will shall be. revoked except in certain specific modes, by what right can
a court declare a will revoked in some other mode.13 Furthermore, in case of wills, the doctrine that the killing revokes the will could not be justified by presuming that
the victim would not desire his slayer to take his property.
A counter presumption would surely arise if the victim
lingered after receiving his wound, and if he orally expressed his forgiveness of the slayer, the rule would be wholly
inapplicable.
It has been contended that both of the foregoing doctrines are erroneous, and that the error in both lines of decisions has grown out Of a failure to recognize and apply
a fundamental distinction between law and equity. "The
error is due to a failure to discriminate between legal and
equitable relief. Both counsel and courts appear to have
assumed that the only question before them was whether
the criminal could take the title to th~e property of his victim-a purely common law question. One and all overlooked that beneficent principle by which equity acting
in personam, compels one who by his misconduct has ac2

$Lectures on Legal History, Ames, p. 312.
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quired a res at common law to hold the res as a constructive trustee for the person wronged, or, if he be dead, for
'24
his representatives.
Accordingly, it has been held in a few cases that the
legal title passes to the slayer but that equity will treat him
as a constructive trustee of the title because of the unconscionable mode of its acquisition, and compel him to convey it to the proper representatives of the deceased, exclusive of the slayer.2
The principle was thus stated by
Andrews, C. J.: "The relief which may be obtained against
her (the murderess and devisee) is equitable and injunctive.
The court in a proper action will, by forbidding the enforcement of a civil right, prevent her from enjoying the
fruits of her inequity. It will not and cannot set aside
the will. That is valid, but it will act upon the facts arising subsequent to its execution and deprive her of the use
of the property. '2 6 The fact that there was no mention
of this principle in similar cases which preceded Ellerson vs.
Wescott is remarkable, because the distinction insisted
upon has been repeatedly recognized and enforced in other
classes of cases.
These decisions by holding that the legal title passes
to the slayer preserve the consistency and render tribute
to the logic of the law. They also neatly illustrate that
constructive trusts are but formulas through which the
conscience of equity finds expression,"2 and that such formulas are merely remedial devices by which a result conceived of as right and just is made to square with the principles and symmetry of the legal system.
To render it impossible for the slayer to enjoy the
property of his victim, without disregarding the statutes
24

Lectures on Legal History, Ames, p. 314.
Ellerson vs. Wescott, 148 N. Y. 154. See also remarks of Maclennon, J., in McKinnon vs. Lundy, 21 Ont. App. 567 and Fry, L. J.,
vs. Mutual Assn. (1892) 1 Q. B. 158.
in Cleaver
26
EIlerson vs. Wescott, supra.
25

27

Beatty vs. Guggenheim Co., 225 N. Y. 386.
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of descent or statutes of wills, as do courts of the second
class, and without resorting to judicial subterfuges, as do
courts of the third class, statutes have been passed in a
number of states barring the slayer from acquiring rights
in property by inheritance or will from his victim. 8
The twenty-third section of the Intestate Act of 1917
provides: "No person who shall be finally adjudged guilty,
either as principal or accessory, of murder of the first or
second degree, shall be entitled to inherit or take any part
of the real or personal estate of the person killed, as surviving spouse, heir, or next of kin to such person under the
29
provisions of this act."
It has been said that this section was framed to meet
the situation presented in Carpenter's Estate, 0 but it seems
to be much broader in its scope. In Carpenter's Estate the
motive for the crime was to get possession of the estate of
the decedent, but the statute does not require such a motive. It may well be argued that only a killing with a purpose of hastening the acquirement of property should deprive one of enjoying its benefits. 31 Perhaps, however, the
difficulty of proving such a motive renders it expedient to
extend the rule to all -intentional killings.
The killing in Carpenter's Estate was intentional, and
it may well be argued that a killing which is not intentional
should not bar the slayer from taking the property, 2 but
the statute applies to all killings which constitute murder.
An unintentional killing may constitute murder in the first
degree, and in all cases of murder in the second degree the
killing is unintentional. The statute therefore covers many
situations other than that presented in Carpenter's Estate.
Har. L. Rev. 624.
The Wills Act of 1917 has a similar provision. See sec. 22.
8
°Report of Commissioners, p. 47.
31
See Gollnek vs. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349; In re Wolf, 15 N. Y. S.
2830

29

378.

32See remarks of Minor, J., in Scheurer vs. I. 0. 0. F., 35 I1.
App. 576.
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The statute applies only where the killing amounts to
murder. A killing which constitutes voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, or justifiable or excusable homicide is
not with its terms. A proper understanding of this civil
statute therefore requires a thorough knowledge of the
criminal law of homicide.
Insanity of certain kinds will prevent a killing from
being murder. A slayer who suffered from the requisite
kind of insanity would not be barred by this statute from
taking the property of his victim." A proper understanding of the statute may thus require a knowledge of the
law of criminal insanity.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Legislative divorces are forbidden in Pennsylvania,
and the causes for judicial divorce are prescribed by statute. Courts have no power to grant divorces except upon
the grounds prescribed.14 Among the causes prescribed by
statute is "adultery."
The term adultery has been variously defined.8

At

6.

The tort was
common law it was a tort but not a crime
defined as carnal knowledge by a married woman with a
man other than her husband.3 7 This was also the definition of the Roman law," but according to the canon or
ecclesiastical law adultery was defined to be voluntary sexual intercourse by a married person with any other than
the lawful spouse.39 In divorce cases it is said, the English courts adopted the definition of the common law, and
s3 See In re Estate of Mason, 31 Dom. L. R., 305; In re Hough-

ton, (1915) 2 Ch. 173; Holdorn vs. A. 0. U. W., 159 Ill. 619.
34Const. of Penna., Art III, sec 7; Aikens vs. Aikens, 57 Super.
424.
35C. vs. Kilwell, I Pitts, 255.
s6C. vs. Lehr, 2 C. C. 341.

s7C. vs. Lehr.
38 Matchin vs. Matchin, 6 Pa. 336.
SC. vs. Kilwell.
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held that a divorce for adultery could be obtained only by a
40

husband.

In Pennsylvania adultery was at an early date denounced as a crime, and the crime has been uniformly defined as sexual intercourse by a married person with any
person not his or her wife or husband."
The courts in divorce cases have adopted this definition, but they have refused to hold that a divorce for adultery will be granted only if the crime of adultery has been
committed. Thus it has been held that a wife's insanity is
not a defense to a libel for divorce, because of adultery,
though it would be a defense to an indictment for adultery,
and that adultery under the irresistable impulse of that
morbid activity of the sexual propensity which is called
nymphomania, or more recently erotic mania, is certainly
4
ground for divorce. 1

The rules of the criminal law that neither condonation nor entrapment nor the fact that the injured party
was himself guilty of a wrong is a defense, have not been
wholly adopted in civil cases for divorce because of adul43

tery.

EQUITY
In the early days of equity when the state was weak
and unable thoroughly to enforce peace, the chancellors actually exercised criminal jurisdiction to repress violence
and restrain the lawlessness of the great against the poor
and helpless, but by the end of the fifteenth century the
need for relief of this sort had ceased, and this jurisdiction
had been practically abandoned."
vs. Lehr, but see contra C. vs. Kilwell.
4"Res. vs. Roberts, 2 Dall. 124; Helfrich vs. C, 33 Pa. 68; C. vs.
Lehr;2 C. vs. Kilwell.
4 Matchin vs. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332.
48See P. & L. Dig. Dec. vol. 1, p. 571; Jackson vs. Jackson, 49
Sup. 18.
"Clark on Equity, sec. 244.
40C.
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It is now the rule that equity will not enjoin an act
merely because it is a crime; nor will it refuse to enjoin an
aq;t merely because it is a crime, if there are other grounds
for exercising jurisdiction.

4

In determining whether an act shall be enjoined, its
criminal character is not, however, entirely disregarded.
The fact that an act is a crime makes equity cautious in
granting an injunction against it, even where other grounds
of equity jurisdiction exist, because of the preeminent appropriateness of trial by jury in criminal cases. 6
A court of equity, as a general rule, will not enjoin
criminal proceedings.' 7 "Courts of equity * * * are without jurisdiction to enterfere by injunction with the administration of criminal justice."'' 8

The application of this prin-

ciple is sometimes difficult and requires a precise knowledge of the nature of crime. Thus, where a statute provided that a violation of its provisions should constitute
"a misdemeanor," and imposed a "penalty" "to be recovered
by a suit in the name of the Commonwealth," it was held
that equity had jurisdiction to enjoin a proceeding under
this statute, because violation of this statute was not a
crime and a proceeding under the statute was not a criminal proceeding."9
The maxim, "He who comes into equity must come
with clean hands," is of ancient origin and broad application."' It precludes the granting of equitable relief to a
party who has been guilty of criminal conduct in the transaction concerning which relief is sought.5

"5Clark on Equity, sec. 244; Klein vs. Club, 177 Pa. 224.
"6Clark on Equity, sec. 245.
'7Pomeroy's Equity, sec. 644.
,8P. R. R. vs. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581.
,9P. R. R. vs. Ewing, 241 Pa. 581. For explanation of principles
underlying this decision, see Kenny's Crim. L., p. 1.
5021 C. J., p. 180.
5121 C. J., p. 191.
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EVIDENCE
It is a rule of the common law that a witness cannot be
compelled to answer a question if the answer would incriminate him. The rule is local in its origin, and has no
counterpart in the other legal systems of the world. In
the common law it is the relic of controversies and conculsions which have long since ceased, but in most states
constitutional and statutory provisions have added to its
2
sanction.
A distinct privilege against disclosing facts of disgrace or infamy, irrespective of criminality, was created
by the common law later than the privilege against selfcrimination and independently of it. This privilege, in
most jurisdictions, has fallen into disuse. It has been
recognized in Pennsylvania in a few cases.13
The privilege agaitast self-crimination extends to witnesses in civil cases. It often happens in civil cases that
a main part of the issue concerns conduct which is also
criminal. The privilege protects nevertheless. The mere
fact that a civil liability inheres in the same act does not
override the criminal liability, for it would not be possible
to disclose the former without also disclosing the latter.
This extension of the privilege frequently causes hardship
to the parties in civil actions, but it is unquestioned."
The facts protected from disclosure are distinctly facts
involving criminal liability or its equivalent. Facts involving civil liability merely are entirely without the scope
of the privilege5 5 A knowledge of the criminal law is
therefore necessary for the proper application of this rule
of evidence in civil cases.
52Penna.
5

Const. Art I, sec. 9; Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158.
8Henry on Trial Evidence, see. 490.

54Hartsman vs. Kaufman, 97 Pa. 147.
55P. & L. Dig. Dec. vol. 23, p. 41720.
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INSURANCE
The risks insured against in many present day policies
of insurance are "larceny," "embezzlement," "burglary,"
etc. These are "terms of the criminal law and in no respect are they terms of contract law." The test by which
to determine whether the beneficiary can recover upon
such a policy is whether a criminal court would decide that
one of the enumerated crimes had been committed. 56
Policies of life and accident insurance frequently contain clauses, varying somewhat in terms, which declare in
effect that the company shall not be liable at all, or liable
only for a reduced amount if the death or injury of the insured occurs while he is engaged in a violation of law."
The exemption from liability stipulated for by these clauses
is sometimes expressly restricted to violations of the criminal law, and even. in absence of such express restriction
it is held that such clauses apply only to violations of the
criminal law."'
The application of such clauses requires an accurate
knowledge of the rules of the criminal law prescribing the
acts which are criminal and determining when a person
may be said to be engaged in such acts.5 9
The difficulty of deciding what acts are criminal is
illustrated by cases in which the insured has died as a result of an abortion to which she voluntarily submitted. In
such a case it was held that there could be no recovery because "it cannot be questioned that a woman who solicits
the commission of the offense and submits her body for
its perpetration can be regarded as other than a participant
in its commission and is .therefore criminally responsible,"
and "viewed in that light the deceased comes directly with"Reed vs. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 189 Pa. 596; Schonfeld vs.
Royal Co., 76 Super. 299; 38 Cyc. 274.
5737 Cyc. 548.
5814 R. C. L. 1226; 3 Ann. Cas. 873; 14 M. A. L. 140.
5937 C. J. 548; Lawton vs. Travellers' Ins. Co., 30 D. R. 696.
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in the clause of the policy."60 Perhaps the plaintiff in this
case would not have been denied a recovery if his counsel
had known and vigorously asserted the rule that a woman
who commits an abortion upon herself is not guilty of a
crime."'
The death or injury must occur while the insured is engaged in the commission of the crime. In applying this
rule it is necessary to consider the recent decisions which
hold that one is engaged in the commission of a crime,
even after the crime is technically complete, until he leaves
the place where the crime is committed, and even after he
has left this place and is fleeing to escape. 62
SALES
A sale of goods has been defined as an agreement
whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the
buyer for a consideration called the price.63 This definition is obviously merely a label to decribe a result and
not a trustworthy formula indicating how that result is
reached. Consequently much difficulty has been experienced in applying it.
A conflict of opinion exists, for example, upon the
question whether the furnishing of food by an innkeeper
to his guest constitutes a sale. The weight of authority
supports the view that it is not a sale but a rendition of service. 6 ' An innkeeper, it is naively remarked in an early
case, "does not sell but utters his provisions.""5 With equal
naivete, it has been held in a recent case that the guest
does not acquire or pay for the title to the food but only
60

Wells vs. Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207. There were other grounds for
denying a recovery. See McCreighton vs. American Union, 11 Sup.
332.
61C. vs. Weible, 45 Super. 207; C. vs. Bricker, 74 Super. 239.
62C. vs. Lawrence, 282 Pa. 128; C. vs. Doris, (Pa.) 135 A. 313.
63

Uniform Sales Act, sec. 1.

64Beale on Innkeepers, sec. 169.
""Parker vs. Flint, 12 Mod. 254.
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the right to satisfy his appetite by the process of destruction.

66

The same rule has been applied, with doubtful propriety, to the furnishing of food by a restauranter. 67 In
a restaurant a customer generally pays not for a meal but
for a definite portion of food. Surely one who pays for
and secures a piece of pie at an "Automat" secures title to
68
it and may take it and carry it away without wrong.

There are well considered cases in which it is held
that such transactions constitute sales.6" The question has
most frequently arisen in cases in which the patron of an
inn or restaurant has been served impure food, and has
been made ill thereby, and has sued the proprietor relying
upon an implied warranty of fitness.
It is a rule of the common law that where articles of
food are sold by a dealer for immediate consumption, there
is an implied warranty that the food is wholesome,"0 and
the Uniform Sales Act has been held to express this com71
mon law rule.

Applying this rule, it has been held that the proprietor
of an inn or a restaurant is an insurer of the quality of his
food, or, as it is usually stated, he impliedly warrants that
the food which he serves is wholesome. 2 Even though the
transaction is not a sale, every argument for implying a
warranty in a sale of food is applicable with even greater
force to the serving of food to a guest or a customer at an
inn or restaurant. A sale is not the only transaction in
which a warranty may be implied.
66

Merrill vs. Hudson, 88 Conn. 314, 54 L. N. S. 481.

67Merrill vs. Hudson, 88 Conn. 314, L. R. A. 1915 B. 481, Ann. Cas.

1916 D. 1917.
O8See Valeri vs. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519.
09
Friend vs. Childs Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R.
1100.
70Williston on Sales, vol. 1, see. 241.
71
Friend vs. Childs Co. 231, Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5 A, L, R.
100; Merrill vs. Hudson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 A. 533, L. R. A. 1915 B.
481, Ann. Cas. 1916 D. 1917.
72Friend vs. Childs Co.
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The weight of authority, however, supports the view
that as an innkeeper or a restauranteur does not sell the
food which he furnishes a patron, and there is therefore
no implied warranty of quality, he is liable only if he
knowingly or negligently furnishes deleterious food. 8
The question, precisely in this form, has apparently
never been presented to the courts of Pennsylvania. When
it is presented, it will be useful to know that it has been
held that a restauranteur who serves oleomargarine with
a meal to a patron, violates a penal statute prohibiting the
sale of oleomargarine."' In view of these decisions, it will
be difficult to hold "that the transaction arising from a contract to serve a guest food to be eaten by him on the
premises of the keeper of an eating house is not a sale." 5
A vendor of goods who has no title to the goods can
ordinarily transfer none to his vendee; but a vendor who
has a voidable title can transfer a good title to a purchaser
for value in good faith and without notice. 6
The distinction is entirely devoid of ethical significance,
but is important and difficult of application. In applying
it, the courts have frequently resorted to the distinction
which the criminal law makes between the crimes of larceny and false pretences. They have held that if the acquisition of goods by the vendor constituted larceny, he
acquired no title and could transfer none; but if it constituted false pretences, he acquired a voidable title and could
convey a good title to a bona fide purchaser."7 This test
has been employed in jurisdictions in which the distinction
73Beale on Innkeepers, sec. 169; 22 Cyc. 1081; 16 A. & E. Encyc.
547; Williston on Sales, vol. 1, sec. 242 b.
74C. vs. Miller, 131 Pa. 118, 18 A. 938, 6 L. R. A. 633.
See also
C. vs. Hendley, 7 Sup. 356; C. vs. Weiss, 139 Pa. 247.
75 Friend vs. Childs Co.
76Compare Uniform Sales Act, secs. 23 and 24.
7735 Cyc. 361, Yaks vs. Russell, 20 Ariz. 338, 180 Pac. 910, Bryant vs. Bank, 150 N. Y. S. 1010; Philips vs. McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232,
115 N. E. 441, L. R A. 1918 B. 973.
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between larceny and false pretences was avowedly abul:sh78
ed in criminal cases.
The fact that the courts in deciding this question of
civil law have resorted to one of the most subtle and unjustifiable distinctions of the criminal law is a striking illustration of the aphorism "Incidit in Scyllam, cupiens
vetare Charybdim." It is not surprising that in its appli79
cation the courts have made some erroneous decisions.
TORTS
A distinction has long been taken between a tort and
a crime, but the authorities differ as to what the distinction is. 0 It is now the better view that the distinction is
extrinsic, and that there is no essential intrinsic distinction
between a crime and a tort. "There are no certain and
universal qualities which at once stamp an act with the
character of a crime." 8
It follows that the same act may be, and frequently
is, both a crime and a tort,82 and when this is so, a knowledge of the law with reference to the crime is, of course,
useful in deciding questions relative to the tort.
It is necessary to remember, however, that although
most acts which constitute crimes are also torts, this is
not true of all crimes. Of crimes which are not torts there
are four classes: (1) Crimes which affect the state alone,
e. g., treason or seditious libel; (2) Crimes which, though
aimed at a private individual, are checked before any actual
harm has been done to him, e. g., forgery; (3) Crimes which
affect injuriously only the criminal himself, e. g., attempted suicide; (4) Crimes, which, for various reasons of policy
have been held not to constitute torts, e. g., perjury.
78
Amos
79

vs. Berstein, 212 N. Y. S. 518.

See Amos vs. Berstein.
80Compare Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 2, Austin's
Jurisprudence, p. 518, and Salmond's Jurisprudence, p. 72.
SiHarris' Crim. L., p. 1. See especially Kenny's Crim. L., p. 3.
82Foster

vs. C., 8 W. & S. 77.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
It is also necessary to remember that the same act may
constitute both a crime and a tort, bilt as a crime and as a
tort it may have different names, as, for example, larceny
and trespass, conversion and embezzlement; and that the
same name may be used to describe both a crime and a
tort of which, however, the elements are not the same, as,
83
e. g., seduction, conspiracy, and libel.
Libel and slander are not merely different names for
the same wrong, committed in different ways, but are
torts of very different historical origin. s4 As a consequence, the rules applicable to the two torts are not identical. A libel is actionable without proof of special damages, but slander is ordinarily actionable only when special
damage is proved. 5 Slanderous communications imputing
the commission of a crime constitute an exception to this
rule. They are actionable per se, that is, without proof of
special damages. 86
The application of this exception requires an extensive
knowledge of the rules of criminal law. Thus in an action
for slander where the words alleged to have been spoken
were that the plaintiff "had stolen corn out of Grubb's
field," it was held that if the people who heard these words
understood them to refer to standing corn, there could be
no recovery because it was not larceny to take and immediately carry away standing corn.8 7 And where the alleged slanderous words were "Sommer and wife stole $1,000
from the old man," it was held that the wife could not recover because the words imported a "stealing by a wife
in her husband's presence which is impossible." 8 And where
a defendant who had called the plaintiff a "thief" attempt1
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course every trespass is not a larceny and every conversion

is not embezzlement but conduct may amount to trespass and larceny,
and 84
conversion and embezzlement.
Jenk's History of English Law, p. 144.
8
"Clark on Torts, p. 279.
88
87Clark

on Torts, p. 274.
Stitzell vs. Reynolds, 67 Pa. 54.
8
SBash vs. Somner, 20 Pa. 162.
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ed to justify his words by proving that the plaintiff had'
taken wild bees from a tree on the defendant's land, it was
held that this did not constitute justification because the
taking of wild bees did not constitute larceny. 8
CONCLUSION
It is generally conceded that in England the criminal
law is reasonably effective in preventing crime. This is
attributed to the efficient manner in which the criminal
law is administered. In England a criminal trial is quick,
simple, and direct, and therefore the mal-administration
of the criminal law is.not a subject of national mortification. 90

A comparison between the United States and England
is most difficult because of the great difference in conditions, but keeping in mind this difficulty of accurate comparison between a country of such diversified sections as
the United States and a compact country like England, and
endeavoring to arrive at a general estimate, it must be
conceded that the United States, as a whole, has much to
learn from England.
In England no apparent distinction exists between civil
and criminal practice, and barristers accept both kinds of
cases indiscriminately. Perhaps then the chief lesson that
the United States may learn from England is that the successful administration of the criminal law can be accomplished only when there are no longer any so-called "criminal lawyers." There will continue to be such lawyers as
long as the more reputable lawyers abstain from the study
and practice of the criminal law. The abrasion of the motives which lead to this abstention is the writer's thesis.
WALTER HARRISON HITCHLER
69Wallis vs. Mease, 3 Binney 546.
-Philadelphia Lawyers in the London Courts, Learning, p. 163.
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MOOT COURT
THOR VS ODEN
Easements--Quasi- Easements--Ways--Intention-Vendor
and Vendee -

Trespass

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Thor owned a large tract of land situated on a public highway.
His home was situated on the portion farthest removed from the
highway. He commonly and usually used a particular way in passing to the highway although there was another but less convenient
way to a less used and poorer highway. Thor then sold the portion on which the house was situated to Oden, retaining the rest.
Nothing was said in the grant about the way. Oden used the convenient way and is sued in trespass by Thor. Oden claims the way
by an implied grant.

J. Laird, for Plaintiff.
Shenkman, for Defendant.
Atkins, J. This is an action of trespass brought upon an oftlitigated cause of action ,namely, the exercise of a right of way by
a grantee over the land of his grantor. The facts are not in dispute:
that there is an express grant of a right of way is not alleged; that
Oden has gone upon the land of Thor is not denied. Thor, in
imitation of his mythical ancestor, is now launching the thunderbolts of the law at Oden. The latter's sole defense rests in the assertion of a right, arising from an implied grant of a right of way.
The cases on this particular phase of the law are numerous
and conflicting, but in this state at least, they seem to be in accord
and the rules covering the subject clear-cut and established by a long
list of decisions. From these we derive the following conclusions:
Where an owner of a tract of land subjects a portion of it to
a servitude for the benefit of another portion of the tract, he creates
what the writers term a "quasi-easement." (So called in order to
distinguish from a true easement which can exist only in different
estates.) If he later conveys one of these portions, he thereby
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grants or reserves (as the case may be), by implication of law, an
easement or servitude in favor of the dominant portion; and the
quasi-easenlent becomes a true easement created by implication.
This doctrine of the creation of easements by implication is found
in both the civil law and the common law, and is based on the principle that the purchaser is entitled to the land and its apparent appurtenances as they existed when he bought it.
But in order that such an easement may arise, certain features
must be present. They are enumerated as follows, in the case of
Grace Church vs. Dobbins, 153 Pa. 249: "Where an owner subjects
part of his land to an open, visible, and continuous service
in favor of another .... ." It is in the definition and number of
these requirements that the courts of the various jurisdictions differ. We shall confine our attention to the interpretations of these
requirements, as laid down by the courts of this state.
An easement, to be "open and visible" or, as some writers term
it, "apparent," need not be of such character that it must necessarily
be seen, but this requirement is satisfied if it is one "which may be
seen on a careful inspection." Kieffer vs. Imhoff, 26 Pa. 436.
In construing the word "continuous," the definition in all jurisdictions is purely arbitrary, very few courts insisting on a rigid compliance with the literal meaning of that term. The courts of this
state are very liberal in the construction of this requirement. Suffice to say that the cases in this jurisdiction are seemingly unanimous in holding that a clearly defined road over the servient tenement indicates a continuous user. Kieffer vs. Imhoff, supra; Liquid
Carbonic Co. vs. Wallace, 219 Pa. 457; Phillips vs. Phillips, 48 Pa. 178.
Another feature strongly stressed by the courts, and brought
out in the argument of both counsels, is that of necessity. As
construed by the courts, this necessity means a reasonable and not
an absolute necessity. It is sufficient if it is "essential to the proper
enjoyment of the land." Phillips vs. Phillips, 48 Pa. 178 the court
regards the word as meaning nothing more than convenient. In
Liquid Carbonic Co. vs. Wallace, 219 Pa. 457, on facts strikingly
analogous to the case at bar, an implied grant of a right of way over
the grantor's land was upheld by the court, because access to the
highway over the grantee's land could be had only by means of a
road "hilly and inconvenient."
At this point we wish to call attention to the distinction between
the requirement of necessity in order that an easement of right of
way be implied, and the true way by necessity. Tiffany on Real
Property, page 713, expresses the distinction as follows:
"Easements of necessity are to be distinguished from those
last discussed (i. e. implied easements) by the fact that their exis-
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tence is not dependent upon the previous existence of quasi-easements of an apparent and continuous character, but they are implied
because otherwise the land could not be utilized." Might not a good
deal of the confusion on this subject be due to a failure to note the
difference between the two situations?
Applying the specific tests as construed by our courts, to the
facts of the present case, we have no difficulty in arriving at the
conclusion that a grant of a right of way over the land of Thor
should be implied. Certainly a "common and usual" use of a particular mode of ingress and egress would result in a clearly defined roadway that satisfy the requirement of continuity. And the facts as
stated aver that the road over the grantee's land was a "less convenient way to a less used and poorer highway"-a situation which,
in the light of the Pennsylvania cases on this point, and particularly
that of Liquid Carbonic Co. vs. Wallace, supra, would justify our
holding this to be a necessary easement.
Plaintiff's counsel has called the'attention of the court to the
absence of stipuation in the deed, relative to such a right. We will
refer to the case of Seibert vs. Levan, 8 Barr. 383, in which the court
states:
"In the absence of express reservation or agreement on the
subject, (he) takes the property subject to the easement." See
also the cases of Cannon vs. Boyd, 73 Pa. 176, and Liquid
Cargonic Company vs. Wallace, cited supra, all of which seem to
disregard the undisclosed intentions or expectations of the parties,
and to regard only that intent as can be gathered from the acts
and circumstances of the parties in respect to what is visible and
apparent.
We therefore decide that a right of way did exist in the defendant, by virtue of an implied grant, and that the plaintiff cannot
recover in this action for acts done by the defendant in the exercise
of this right.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has correctly disposed of the issue pre,
sented. The Pennsylvania courts have been very liberal in their
passing of quasi-easements by implied grant. This is particularly so
in their construction of continuousness of such an easement. The
authorities are numerous for holding that a well defined road is
continuous and will pass as an implied grant even though not
necessary to the enjoyment of the land granted. Such a case is
Liquid Carbonic Co. vs. Wallace, 219 Pa. 457 which stands unreversed and unquestioned.
The able opinion of the learned court below and his judgment
founded thereon is affirmed.
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A VS C
Real Property-Wills-"Heirsr-Words of Limitation-Fee Tail Estates Under Act of 1917, P. L. 403, See. 13.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X died on January 1, 1926, and by his will gave all his real estate
to A and his heirs but on failure of issue, "and by this I mean indefinite failure of issue," then over to B and his heirs in fee. A
contracted to sell the fee of a property gotten by this devise, to
C. C refused to accept the conveyance claiming that it could not
convey a fee. A sues C for the purchase price.
Gerofsky, for Plaintiff.
Cassone, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Williams, J. The sole question presented by the case at bar is
whether the will in question is to be construed to mean a definite
or an indefinite failure of issue? Section one of the Act of July
9, 1897, P. L. 213 provides as follows: "That in any gift, grant,
devise or bequest of real or personal estate, the words 'Die without
issue' or, 'Die without leaving issue' or 'Have no issue' or any
other words which may import either a want or failure of issue of
any person in his life time or at the time of his death, or an indefinite failure of his issue, shall be construed to mean a want or failure of issue in the lifetime or at the death of such person, and not
an indefinite failure of issue, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the deed, will or other instrument in which such gift, grant,
devise or bequest is made or contained." This provision as to
devises is reenacted in the Wills Act of 1917, Sec. 14, P. L. 403. This
act changes the common law rule' in Pennsylvania, the common law
always construing such words to mean an indefinite failure of issue.
Smith vs. Piper, 231 Pa. 378. It is necessary to note that the act
does not set an absolute rule of construction but declares such phrases
shall be interpreted to mean a definite failure of issue unless a contrary intent appears in the instrument using such words. The act
creates a statutory presumption in favor of a definite failure of
issue and unless this court can find something in the will to indicate
a contrary intent on the part of the testator, this presumption must
prevail.
In English's Estate, 270 Pa. 1 the court speaking of this act says:
"By something else in the instrument is meant something in ad* dition to the words under investigation; that is to say, some context or explanation, supplementing the words in question, which
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shows that the testator meant an indefinite failure of issue." In
the present will the devise is "To A and his heirs but on failure
of issue," if the will had stopped there, the statutory presumption
would undoubtedly be applicable, but the testator goes further and
explains what he means by the words "But on failure of issue" by
expressly declaring "And by this I mean indefinite failure of issue."
We fail to see how the testator could have more clearly explained
his intention as to the definite or indefinite failure of issue, than by
an express declaration that he means an indefinite failure of issue.
We hold that the act of July 9, 1897, supra, has no application, to
the present case, the statutory presumption being rebutted by the
contrary intent of the testator clearly appearing in the instrument
creating the estate.
Having concluded that the words of the will must be construed
to mean a devise to A and his heirs, and upon an indefinite failure
of issue, then over to B in fee, the next question is what quantum
of estate did A take in the land? The authorities ari uniform in
holding that he took an estate in fee tail, that the executory limitation over to B is void as violating the rule against perpetuities unless it can take effect as a vested remainder. Eichelberger vs. Barnitz, 9 Watts 447, Graham vs. Abbott, 208 Pa. 68. A's estate being a
fee tail it is converted into a fee simple by operation of Section
thirteen of the Wills Act of 1917, supra, which provides as follows:
"Whenever by any devise an estate in fee tail would be created,
according to the common law of this state, such devise shall be
taken and construed to pass an estate in fee simple, and as such,
shall be inherited and freely alienable." A having a fee simple title
has a good and marketable title which C by his contract is bound to
accept, and A is entitled to recover the purchase price.
The court desires to point out that even though this will could be
construed as meaning a definite failure of issue, the decision would
remain unchanged. In Patterson vs. Reed, 260 Pa. 319, the court
pronounced the rule that if the words used in the will be construed
to mean a definite and not an indefinite failure of issue and the
estate given is absolute subject to a limitation over upon failure of
issue, the words will be construed as referring to death without issue in the life time of the testator if the gift is immediate or if not
immediate, during the continuance of the intermediate estate, and
if devisee survives the testator, his interest becomes absolute. . ..
If however he does not so survive, the limitation over takes effect as
an executory devise. In the present case the gift is immediate, A has
survived X, the testator, the gift being to A and his heirs, is absolute.
The case falling within the above stated rule the devise to A is
absolute.
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Under either view of the case the estate vested inA is absolute
and he is entitled to recover the purchase price of the land.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
There can be no question that such a contrary intention is shown
by the present will as will rebut the statutory presumption of a
definite failure of issue. What estate then is taken by the first devisee where there is a limitation over to another on the indefinite
failure of the issue of the devisee? The decided cases are unafiimous
in holding that the devisee takes a fee simple estate, the fee -tail
estate which he would take by the common law being enlarged into
a fee simple by the Wills Act of 1917, Sec. 13. But is the fee simple
subject to the executory interest in B to arise on failure of issue? If
it is A has not the title which he contracted to convey. But the
interest of B not being a vested interest may not vest for 100 or 200
years and is clearly void under the rule against perpetuities. This
interest being void, A has an absolute fee simple and his action for
the purchase price must be upheld. Cf. Arnold vs. Muh. College, 277
Pa. 321, and Christy's Estate, 245 Pa. 529.
Judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

BOSS VS KARNS AND MAY
Mortgage-Real Estate-Fixture&--Ovens-Lien of MortgageAfter Acquired Property-Vendor and Vendee
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Certain ovens were sold to May with an agreement in the form
of a chattel mortgage, that they should remain the property of the
seller and should be regarded as personal property, and subject to
retaking by the seller regardless of their annexation to the realty
of May. This agreement was recorded. Previous to the purchase of
the ovens and while the brick covers were in place but empty, May
had mortgaged the land for $2000, the market value of the property
in its condition when mortgaged and the value of the property at
the time this action is brought. May annexed the ovens and it
would now require a demolition of the brick covers to take them
out. May has broken his contract with Boss, the seller, by failing
to pay for them. This is an action by Boss, the plaintiff, to recover
the ovens.
H. M. Miller, for Plaintiff.
Oshansky, for Defendant.
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Under either view of the case the estate vested inA is absolute
and he is entitled to recover the purchase price of the land.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
There can be no question that such a contrary intention is shown
by the present will as will rebut the statutory presumption of a
definite failure of issue. What estate then is taken by the first devisee where there is a limitation over to another on the indefinite
failure of the issue of the devisee? The decided cases are unafiimous
in holding that the devisee takes a fee simple estate, the fee -tail
estate which he would take by the common law being enlarged into
a fee simple by the Wills Act of 1917, Sec. 13. But is the fee simple
subject to the executory interest in B to arise on failure of issue? If
it is A has not the title which he contracted to convey. But the
interest of B not being a vested interest may not vest for 100 or 200
years and is clearly void under the rule against perpetuities. This
interest being void, A has an absolute fee simple and his action for
the purchase price must be upheld. Cf. Arnold vs. Muh. College, 277
Pa. 321, and Christy's Estate, 245 Pa. 529.
Judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

BOSS VS KARNS AND MAY
Mortgage-Real Estate-Fixture&--Ovens-Lien of MortgageAfter Acquired Property-Vendor and Vendee
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Certain ovens were sold to May with an agreement in the form
of a chattel mortgage, that they should remain the property of the
seller and should be regarded as personal property, and subject to
retaking by the seller regardless of their annexation to the realty
of May. This agreement was recorded. Previous to the purchase of
the ovens and while the brick covers were in place but empty, May
had mortgaged the land for $2000, the market value of the property
in its condition when mortgaged and the value of the property at
the time this action is brought. May annexed the ovens and it
would now require a demolition of the brick covers to take them
out. May has broken his contract with Boss, the seller, by failing
to pay for them. This is an action by Boss, the plaintiff, to recover
the ovens.
H. M. Miller, for Plaintiff.
Oshansky, for Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Halpern, J. The land of May was mortgaged for $2000.00 the
market value of the land. May purchased an oven. from the plaintiff for which the defendant May executed a chattel mortgage. The
plaintiff seeks to recover back the ovens because of non-payment of
the purchase price.
The first question which thus presents itself to the court is
whether or not the ovens after being attached to the realty were real
or personal property. In determining this fact it is necessary to go
to the intention of the parties. From the facts the court believes
it was the intention of the parties that the property remain personalty. The defendant by executing a chattel mortgage clearly showed
that the property in question was to remain personalty. A chattel
mortgage is given only on chattels as the name clearly shows. In
the case of National Bank of Catasaqua vs. North, 160 Pa. 303, the
court reiterated the statement of Justice Knowlton in Hopewell
Mills vs. The Saving Bank, 150 Mass. 519. The eminent Jurist
stated that it is the intention of the parties that primarily governs.
The next question is as to the interest of the defendant, Karns.
Karns no doubt has an interest in the property which if it were demolished would impair his security. The defendant contends that
to remove the ovens would result in the demolition of his security,
claiming that the plaintiff cannot recover, stating as the rule,
"Where a chattel mortgagee took his mortgage knowing that the
goods were to be annexed to the realty, he will be protected in so
far as the detachment will not diminish the security held by the
prior mortgagee." 11 C. J. 445.
The defendant also contends that this is a conditional sale and
the plaintiff cannot recover. The conditional sales act of May 1925,
P. L. 722, Sec. 3 provides: "As against a prior mortgagee or other
incumbrance of the realty who has not assented to the reservation
of the property in the chattels, if any of the chattels are so attached
to the realty as not to be severable without material injury'to the
freehold unless such injury although material be such as can be completely repaired and seller before retaking such chattels furnishes
such prior mortgagee a good and sufficient bond conditioned for the
immediate making of such repairs."
By the act of 1901, 4 Purd. 4138, before any writ of replevin
may be issued it is necessary that the plaintiff shall execute a bond
for the use of the parties interested with security double the amount
of the property involved.
We think that the plaintiff by being able to maintain this action of replevin in the court below has sufficiently complied with the
replevin act and has filed a good and sufficient bond as required by
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the conditional sales act of May, 1925, and should be allowed to recover.
Judgment for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
From the facts as given we may not presume that the Conditional Sales Act of May 14, 1925, P L.. 722 is applicable. Although
slightly ambigious, the facts state that there was a "chattel niortgage" given and not a conditional sale with reservation of title. Also
to make this applicable we would have to presume the filing of the
contract and that notice had been given of the intention to retake
by the seller. We conclude therefore that the cited act is inapplicable
Even if the act were applicable the plaintiff could not recover
here. He must affirmatively show that his cause of action is complete before bringing the action. This does not appear. The bond
which is to protect the prior mortgagee must be given or tendered
before suit. The plaintiff may not force the mortgagee into the expense of a suit to protect his interest and after action is begun and
the case at trial, offer the protesting bond. The learned court below seems to have confused the bond which must be filed by the
retaker in replevin and the bond in question. They are not the
same, may not be in like amount and are for totally different purposes.
The court has argued from the fact that replevin was allowed
in a court below. But the facts are so framed as to show that his
was the court of original jurisdiction in this case, Such an argument on a false basis is untenable.
The issue is-may the seller retake the chattel when by doing
so he materially decreases the security of the mortgagee. After
the retaking of the oven the property will be of substantially less
value than when the mortgage was given. As between the parties
to the agreement the oven remained personalty but as to the mortgagee, it became realty and subject to the lien of his prior mortgage. This action of replevin must fail as against the superior
rights of the mortgagee.
Authority for this holding is seen in Bullock E. M. Co. vs. Traction Co., 231 Pa. 129 and cases therein cited. This case has been
followed in Gen. Elec. Co. vs. Richardson, 233 Fed. 84. That such
a situation as this may be avoided by the seller of the chattel by
following the Conditional Sales Act is of interest but not controlling as has been shown above.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed and judgment is here entered for the defendant Karns.
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JONES VS. SMITH
Contracts-Written--Omitted Provisions--Time of the Essence
-Proof-Parol Evidence Admissable.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Smith ordered from Jones 200 footballs by two written orders
both containing the words, "all agreements must be in writing, no
verbal agreements recognized." There was nothing in the orders
Jones sent the footballs two months
showing the time of delivery.
after the receipt of the orders and Smith refused to accept them.
When sued for the price, Smith offered to show by oral evidence
and letters that he had given the contract only on an agreement that
delivery was to be made in two weeks. The court refused the evidence. Verdict for Jones, and Smith appealed.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Belin, J. The question before the sourt is simply this: Did the
lower court err in refusing to allow Smith to show by oral evidence and letters that he had given the contract only upon an
agreement that delivery was to be made in two weeks?
Where a contract for the sale of goods complete on its face is
silent as to the time for delivery, then delivery is to be made within
a reasonable time. Ehinger vs. Baizley Iron Works, 248 Pa. 309.
The Sales Act of 1915 P. L. 543, Section 43, Art. 2 provides as follows: "Where by a contract to sell or sale the seller is bound to
send the goods to the buyer, but no time for sending them is
fixed, the seller is bound to send them within a reasonable time."
This is a rule of law and cannot be varied, contradicted or evaded,
by extrinsic evidence or an oral understanding or agreement between
the parties, that delivery was to be made in a certain specified time.
Driver vs. Ford, 90 I1. 595. Coon vs. Spalding, 47 Mich. 162. Atwood
vs. Cobb, 16 Pick. Mass. 227.
Smith could not have introduced the evidence for the purpose of
showing a specific time for delivery as stated above, but he could introduce the evidence for the purpose of showing what a reasonable
time for delivery would be.
Since the law implies delivery to be within a reasonable time, by
weight of authority this implication is one of mixed fact and law, as
bearing thereon and tending to establish what is a reasonable time,
extrinsic evidence of all surrounding facts and circumstances includ-
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ing parol agreements between the parties as to specific time of delivery is admissable. Cocker vs. Franklin Hemp Co., 2 Sunm. 530
Fed. Case No. 2932.
This specific question of evidence was decided in Meyerscord
Co. vs. Stern, 80 Superior Court 413. The court in this case held the
oral agreement and letters were admissable to show a reasonable
time for delivery, in spite of the provision of the order declaring that
verbal agreements are not to be allowed; but no authorities were
cited in the case to sustain their view.
We reverse the opinion of the lower court.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The case is not without its difficulties but has been correctly
decided. The binding force of Meyerscord Co. vs. Stern, 80 Super.
413, has not been derogated from nor weakened. No case can be
shown in Pa. holding otherwise; merely general statements applied
in differing situations, which might have induced the court to hold
otherwise. But it would be difficult to receive this evidence in the
face of the statement in Brewing Co. vs. Rusch, 272 Pa. 181, at p. 186,
"it is competent to show a writing was executed on the faith of a
parol promise, although the latter may change the terms of the
former." Here there is not even a change in terms, merely the
explanation of a term implied by law. A statement of the liberal Pa.
holding may be seen in Wigmore's Evidence (2nd Ed) p. 311.
Another ground for upholding the admission is that the facts
state that "letters" were used to show the agreement. This is not
contrary to the express agreement of the parties which did not express that the whole agreement of the parties was in the one writing.
Had this been so the result might have been otherwise.
The judgment of the learned court below permitting the reception
of the oral and "letter" evidence is affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Problems in Law for Law School and Bar Examination Review.
Edited by Henry Winthrop Ballantine. Published by West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.
In 1915 the editor of this book prepared his problems in the Law
of Contracts. ]Both books are collections of concrete problems the
solution of which requires a knowledge of the most important fundamental principles which bar examiners and law teachers are in
the habit of stressing. The books differ in an important respect. The
earlier book gives no answers. It refers the student to the sources
of the law. To get the answer, the reader must read the authorities
cited. He can use it only in a well equipped library. The present
offering gives these same full citations of sources but it also gives
the answer with reasons. What is lost in the development of the
ability of the student to work out his own conclusions, is gained in
the utility of the book to many who do not have the time to perform
all this labor in addition to their regular law school work. The
questions and answers have been prepared by teachers in the leading
law schools. Twenty-six teachers have contributed one or more
subjects. The book is much more than a cramming device. It is
much the best book of its type that has appeared. The questions
challenge the thinking power of students and test their ability to
apply the principles they have learned. Reference is frequently
made to law review articles for those whose interest seeks an exhaustive discussion. The book can be cordially recommended to both
teachers and students.

Brief Making and the Use of Law Books, 5th Ed. Edited by Roger
W. Cooley, with specimen pages compiled by Lafayette S. Mercer. Published by West Publishing Co, St. Paul, Minn.
The first edition of this book was a small volume published in
1905. It aims to enable the lawyer and student to take full advantage of the tools of his profession. It explains the scope, plan
and arrangement of the different types of law books. Many lawyers can find the law with facility in text books and in books of
the encyclopedic type but waste a lot of time in the use of the Century Digest and its supplements or in the use of the various series of
annotated cases. Many lawyers do not get full value from Shepard's Citations. This book is the only onq we know of which enables
the reader to actually inspect typical pages from all the different
portions of all types of law books and so, without getting out of his
chair, to follow the explanations of the editor as to how to secure
the maximum utility from the books he has been able to put in his
library. With this knowledge one may make a relatively exhaustive
search for the law with a limited library and he may attain results
much more satisfactory than his competitor with much better library
facilities but with an inadequate understanding as to how to use
what is at his hand. The more limited one's library, the more im-
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portant it is to study this book. The time spent in such study will
be saved many times over before the first year's practice has passed.
Part III is devoted to the use of decisions and statutes, their weight
as authority, how to distinguish doctrine and dicta, how to construe
statutes. Part IV is a discussion of how to prepare a trial brief and
Part V does the same for the brief on appeal.
The book is eminently practical and well done and cannot be
commended too highly to all young lawyers and to most old ones too.

Handbook of the Law of Equity Pleading and Practice, by Walter
C. Clepham. West Publishing Co, St. Paul, Minn.
The author is a professor of law in George Washington University and is well known as the author of an excellent book on the
Organization and Management of Business Corporations. The book
is an elementary treatise with the usual features of the Hornbook
Series, succinct statements in black-letter type followed by a commentary thereon supported by notes citing the authorities. The very
radical departures in the federal courts as the result of the adoption
of the Federal Equity Rules of 1912 from the system of equity pleading and practice in vogue necessitated a new treatment of the subject. These rules are printed in an appendix together with about one
hundred pages of forms. There is no table of cases. There is a
chapter on "Equitable Defenses in Actions at Law," but it is limited
largely to a discussion of the federal cases. Reference is made to
the 'peculiar practice in Pennsylvania," but no explanation of it
is attempted. Since the equity rules adopted by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania have the force of a statute, Cassidy vs. Knapp, 167
Pa. 305, 307, by virtue of our Act of June 16, 1836, sec. 13, P. L. 784,
the Pennsylvania law student must concentrate his attention upon
the Rules of Equity Practice adopted by the Supreme Court on
May 30, 1924, and effective January 1, 1925.
The author devotes considerable space to the topics of discovery
and pleas, which he acknowledges are of less importance today than
formerly but he explains that, "This elaboration of seemingly unimportant matter is due to the fact that, without a thorough knowledge
of the philosophy upon which these topics are founded, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand the subject of equity pleading
and practice at all, even as known to our modern federal tribunals."
As a preparation for practice in the federal courts and to enable
a student to understand the development of the modern system of
equity pleading and practice, the book will prove very useful but
much that is found even in the black-letter type could not be followed
with safety by a Pennsylvania lawyer practicing in the state ocurts.

